5.2 NARMADA SAGAR
5. 3 SARDAR SAROVAR
5. 4 EFFECTS ON THE LOCAL POPULATION
Lack of data
Land for land
Local participation
Problems for the affected tribal populations
Rehabilitation
5. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Hydrology
Deforestation and catchment area treatment
Agriculture
Salinisation and waterlogging
Water flow, erosion and water quality
Fisheries
Seismicity
5. 6 THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
The Morse commission
The Bank withdraws
5. 7 COSTS AND BENEFITS
5. 8 RESISTANCE TO THE PROJECT
Would rather drown than move
<< Tilbake til rapportens hovedinnholdsfortegnelse
5. 1 THE NARMADA RIVER
The Narmada river flows westwards 1 300 kilometres from mountainous areas in the state of Madhya Pradesh, before it reaches the Arabian Sea on India's western coast. Narmada is the largest westward-flowing river in the country, and is by many considered the second most holy of all rivers in India. Only the Ganga is considered more holy by the Hindus. The river has 41 major tributaries, and a catchment area of 98 798 square kilometres. Around 20 million people reside in the surroundings of the Narmada river.
Plans for harnessing the waters of the Narmada have been present since the 1930s, and are among the most ambitious in the world. Altogether two large dams, 135 medium-sized and more than 3 000 small dams are planned on the river and its tributaries. The project, called the Narmada Valley Development Project (NVDP), if fully implemented, will submerge 350 000 hectares of forest and 200 000 hectares of agricultural land (Goldsmith & Hildyard, 1986). There are no comprehensive data on how many people will be affected by the projects, but a conservative estimate recons more than one million people will have to be relocated.
In the following, we will describe the two largest dams of the project, the Narmada Sagar and the Sardar Sarovar. We will put the main emphasis on the Sardar Sarovar, as this dam is already under construction.
5.2 NARMADA SAGAR
The Narmada Sagar Projects is comprised of the Narmada Sagar, Omkareshwar and Maheswar dams, of which Narmada Sagar is by far the largest. A catchment area of 61 642 square kilometres has its runoff into the Narmada Sagar dam.
The dam is planned to work in cooperation with the Sardar Sarovar dam situated downstream of Narmada Sagar. Indian environmental authorities treated the two dams as one project when asked to give environmental clearing for the Sardar Sarovar project in 1987. The World Bank, however, chose to see the Sardar Sarovar dam as a separate project when the Bank approved its loan to the project in 1985.
Narmada Sagar, if built, will have substantial negative environmental and social effects compared to the benefits expected. Because of this, the project is probably the most controversial in the Narmada Valley Development Plan.
According to 1981 figures, 130 000 people will be displaced by the project. This figure is probably a serious underestimation, as the figures for displacement by Sardar Sarovar has increased ten times since 1981.
Waterlogging is one of the most serious of the environmental problems the Narmada Sagar is expected to create. In 1985, the Indian Institute of Management made a study (which has now, under mysterious circumstances, disappeared). According to this study, 100 000 hectares in the irrigated areas from the Narmada Sagar and Omkareshwar dam will be threatened by waterlogging (Paranjpye, 1990).
Other problems related to the project are many: deforestation, erosion, and salinisation of agricultural lands, to mention but a few.
According to the original plans, Narmada Sagar was to be completed at the same time as Sardar Sarovar, around the year 2000. However, by 1990 expected construction costs for the Narmada Sagar project had increased by 43 percent compared to the original estimates (Paranjpye, 1990), and today there are no funds available to finance the project. The massive popular protests against the dam is also a serious obstacle to progress.
5. 3 SARDAR SAROVAR
The remaining part of this chapter will discuss Sardar Sarovar. In addition to the dam itself, the Sardar Sarovar Projects consist of a river bed power station, a power station at the entrance to the main canal, and the main canal with its network of irrigation canals. According to the plans, the dam is to be finished by the year 2000, while the canals will be completed in 2020-25 at the earliest. During construction of the canals, water from the dam will pass through the riverbed power station, producing up to 1 400 MW of electrical energy before returning to the original riverbed. As the irrigation network is completed, increasingly more water from the reservoir will be diverted to the canals, through the power station at the entrance to the main canal. Power from this station will be used to pump water into the irrigation system. As water is diverted to the irrigation system, less water is returned through the riverbed power station to the old riverbed, and thus less power will be produced.
The dam and canals are situated in the state of Gujarat, while the reservoir will cover areas in three states: Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The largest part of the submergence zone will be in Madhya Pradesh, the smallest in Gujarat. Thus, the benefits will mainly be in Gujarat, while the other states suffer most of the negative effects.
The earliest plans for the Sardar Sarovar dam were conceived in the 1940s. However, the plans proceeded quite slowly, mainly due to inter-state disagreements. In 1969 a separate body, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, was established to resolve the conflict. The Tribunal handed down its decisions in 1979. These decisions established many of the important principles regarding resettlement of people and distribution of costs and benefits from the project. One main point is that Gujarat should cover the main part of the resettlement costs, as this state will receive most of the project benefits.
According to project authorities, domestic water supply is the most important reason for building the dam. If the plans are realised, some 40 million people are supposed to receive drinking water from Sardar Sarovar. Additionally, irrigation water will be available to 1.9 million hectares of agricultural land, and large areas are to receive household electricity. It is also expected that the project will lead to overall economic growth in the state of Gujarat.
Table 5. 1: Sardar Sarovar and Narmada Sagar
| Sardar Sarovar | Narmada Sagar | |
| Completed | 2000 / 2020 a) | ? |
| Capacity | 1 450 MW | 1 000 MW |
| Dam height | 138 m.o.h | 267 m.o.h |
| Irrigation area | 1 912 150 ha | 123 758 ha |
| Submerged area | 37 000 ha b)/ 117 000 ha c) | 91 348 ha |
| Resettled people | 200 000 b)/ 350 000 d) | 130 000 b) |
a) According to plans, the dam will be completed in 2000. The canals will be completed in 2020 at the earliest.
b) Reservoir only.
c) Total estimate, including land submerged by the canals.
d) Total resettlement, including resettlement caused by canals, nature reserves etc. Conservative estimate.
5. 4 EFFECTS ON THE LOCAL POPULATION
The decisions of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal and World Bank guidelines together state four important principles regarding the displacement of people in the Narmada Valley:
| • | a) To ensure that the tribal people of the valley shall not suffer any loss from the displacement, "detailed, contemporary knowledge of the peoples to be affected" is necessary (World Bank, 1982). |
| • | b) All land lost must be compensated with land of equal quality (World Bank, 1980; Morse, 1992 a; ILO convention 107 (ratified by India in 1958)). |
| • | c) The tribal people must participate in decisions affecting them (World Bank, 1982). |
| • | d) People should not be worse off after being relocated. This is stressed both in the World Bank Operational Manual Statement "Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed projects" (1980) and in the 1985 lending agreement between the Bank and India. In this agreement it is stated that "Oustees shall, promptly after displacement, improve or at least regain the standard of living they were enjoying prior to their displacement". |
Lack of data
A lot of the strongest criticisms against the Sardar Sarovar Projects are directed against principle a) above; the lack of necessary and relevant data regarding the people of the valley and the failure to collect these data before starting the project. This is stressed time and time again in the Report of the Independent Review (the so- called Morse Report). The Morse commission was appointed by the World Bank in 1991 to make an independent review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects (see 5.6). The commission concluded that: "The Bank and India both failed to carry out adequate assessments of human impacts of the Sardar Sarovar Projects. (...) Measures to anticipate and mitigate environmental impact were not properly considered in the design of the Projects because of a lack of basic data and consultation with the affected people" (Morse, 1992 a).
The uncertainties surrounding the perhaps most important figure, namely the number of people that will have to move because of the projects, is only one example of the inadequacies of the data regarding the local populations. In 1979, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal estimated that 6 603 families would have to be relocated. The official estimates of the number of families that would be displaced has increased dramatically since this, to 12 000 in 1987, 30 000 in 1992 and around 40 000 families in 1993. These are the people that will be displaced by the reservoir alone. Some additional 30 000 families will be displaced by the canals. Thus, altogether more than ten times as many as the original estimate of affected people will be displaced by the Sardar Sarovar Projects.
The Morse commission points out that in this situation it is impossible to successfully relocate all those displaced by the projects: "We think that the Sardar Sarovar Projects as they stand are flawed, that resettlement of all those displaced by the Projects is not possible under the prevailing circumstances" (Morse, 1992 a).
Land for land
Perhaps the most basic prerequisite to insure that people do not suffer a loss in living standards after relocation is that their lost land is compensated with new land of equal size and quality. Therefore, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal decided that those families who lost more than 25 percent of their lands should receive an equal amount of land as compensation.
In spite of what seems to be the good intentions of the Tribunal, the detailed guidelines for allotting new land stops large segments of the population from receiving land as compensation. This problem is faced by major sons, by people with no formal land holding titles to their lands, and by those who are to be displaced by the canals. Older sons usually till the earth together with their fathers. In the state of Gujarat, this is recognised, and these sons are liable for compensation. But in the other two project states, in which by far the greatest number of oustees live, these sons have very limited rights. A similar problem is experienced by those who do not have formal ownership rights to their land. In Gujarat, these people are entitled to full compensation, while in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh they are not.
Those to be displaced by the canals are not defined as "Project Affected People" in the same way as those living in the reservoir area, and are not liable for compensation in the form of land. Instead of land they will be compensated with cash (see chapter 3.4 for a discussion on cash as compensation). According to the Morse commission, perhaps as many as half of all those who are in need of compensational land will not receive new land. However, after the Report of the Independent Review, the guidelines for Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh have been somewhat altered, securing land as compensation for more people.
Local participation
Through principle c) above, the tribal peoples’ rights to participation should be secured. This has been neglected in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Projects. The local populations were not informed about the project until project plans were more or less finalised and field work had begun. The only information given from the project authorities was that the project was due, and that they would have to move. Information on their rights was given them through non-governmental organisations (see Morse, 1992 a: p. 153, 173, 187-88, 190, 194, 349).
When projects of this magnitude are executed without consulting the local people, the outcome is more or less destined to be a catastrophe for those affected. The local people are the major experts on the area and themselves, and their suggestions for solutions will often be better from their point of view. The very feeling of having a large project dumped in your backyard without being asked is also a contributing factor in making the local people indifferent or hostile towards the project. In both cases, chances of a successful project are strongly reduced. Lack of local participation in the Sardar Sarovar Projects is an important reason for the protests and non-cooperation movement against the project authorities and the World Bank since 1988.
Problems for the affected tribal populations
Around half of those to be displaced are tribal people. Tribal people are especially vulnerable in a process of relocation. The various tribes living in the Narmada valley have distinct cultural traits and traditions, and their culture and ways of life might easily be undermined if moved to new and unfamiliar areas. There is a great risk of degradation of cultural identity and breaking of social ties, with serious consequences both for individuals and the community as a whole.
Again, the absence of adequate field surveys and consultations are the causes of many of the hardships faced by the displaced tribal peoples. Hardly any relevant socio-economical and cultural studies on the affected tribal communities have been made. It is therefore impossible to make satisfactory plans for the resettlement process. (See chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion on the special problems faced by tribal and indigenous peoples in resettlement projects.)
The tribal peoples of the valley mainly depend on a subsistence economy. In their villages in the valley, they have access to forests where they gather firewood, fodder and some food. In addition, the river provides them with fish. Neither forests nor rivers are to be found at the resettlement sites, and many oustees have been forced to take loans to provide necessities for which they previously did not have to pay.
Rehabilitation
Many doubts have been raised as to whether rehabilitating all oustees will be possible at all. The Government of Madhya Pradesh has recently admitted that it will be almost impossible to resettle all affected people, and has suggested that the dam height be reduced to limit the number of oustees.
The experiences gathered from those that are already resettled are not very inspiring. In a number of resettlement sites, the resettled people feel that they have suffered a significant loss in living standards (Morse, 1992 a). Between December 1993 and June 1995 hundreds of families abandoned their resettlement sites due to the miserable conditions, and returned to their original villages.
The problems with securing land for resettlement, along with the massive popular resistance to the project, has placed the execution of resettlement plans way behind schedule. According to the plans, 3 100 families were to move to resettlement sites in Gujarat by June 1993. Of these, only 1 190 were actually moved. To resettle the remaining 14 000 families that are expected to resettle in Gujarat, resettlement will have to speed up significantly, obviously deteriorating the quality of the process even more. The other two states are even further behind schedule.
During the summer of 1993, the houses of around one hundred families and the crops of another hundred were submerged by monsoon waters accumulating behind the Sardar Sarovar dam wall. Most of those affected had refused to move, but some of the affected families had not been given any offer of resettlement land. In connection with the submergence the protesting local population have been heavily harassed by the police, who have used violence and mass-arrests.
The lowest sluice gates on the Sardar Sarovar dam were closed in February 1994, causing permanent submergence up to a height of 59 meters above sea level. Several families who had their houses submerged following the closure of the gates had not yet been resettled. The dam itself suffered major damages after a severe flood in September 1994, when large portions of the lower part of the dam were washed away, and the underground powerhouse was flooded. In January 1995 work on raising the height of the dam was stopped at 80.3 metres, as the resettlement program was lagging far behind.
As mentioned, resistance to the Sardar Sarovar dam is a major obstacle for the implementation of resettlement plans. Project authorities and others associated with the project are not allowed to enter the villages, and a lot of people simply refuse to move. This leads the Morse commission to conclude that "progress will be impossible except as a result of unacceptable means" (Morse, 1992 a). This view is shared by the anthropologist Lars T. Søftestad: "In light of the present situation, I cannot possibly see how the project can continue as originally planned" (Søftestad, 1992).
5. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The Narmada dam projects are expected to have a number of negative environmental effects. As mentioned above, the Sardar Sarovar and Narmada Sagar projects were for a long time seen as more or less one project. This is relevant especially in connection to environmental effects, and the Morse commission strongly criticises the decision to regard Sardar Sarovar as a separate project. The Morse report states that the cumulative effects of the two projects might be significantly more serious than the sum of effects from each isolated project. The report stresses that a cumulative impact assessment for the two projects is required, but no such report has been made.
Hydrology
Field surveys and baseline data are equally absent on hydrology and environmental issues. The inadequacies are overwhelming for all the environmental aspects of the dam, starting at the most fundamental level: the hydrology of the river. Without reliable data on the river flow, it is impossible to foresee downstream project impact, or the amount of water which could be diverted into the canal network when the dam is built. Water quality and the eroding capacity of the water also depends on the basic hydrological properties of the river, but these have not been adequately studied. There is even strong disagreement on the amount of water carried by the river. The estimate used by the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal has been strongly questioned by both the Morse commission and the Indian economist Vijay Paranjpye (Paranjpye, 1990). If there actually is substantially less water in the river than the project plans assume, this will have unknown (but probably substantial) environmental impacts and might affect the overall viability of the project. Especially the capacity for providing drinking water in the far end of the canals will be reduced, affecting the most drought-prone areas which the project is intended to serve.
According to plans, some 85 percent of the water to be diverted to the canals is to be stored in reservoirs upstream of Sardar Sarovar, Narmada Sagar being the main one. At present it is uncertain whether or not these dams will be built, and if so, when. No assessments have been made to analyse how absence of these dams will affect the environment and the overall performance of the Sardar Sarovar Projects. In the words of the Morse commission, "There is no understanding of the hydrology of the Sardar Sarovar Project, with or without Narmada Sagar" (Morse, 1992 a).
Deforestation and catchment area treatment
The Sardar Sarovar dam will submerge huge forested areas in a region where the forests are already under pressure. The loss of forest implies reduced wildlife areas, loss of biodiversity and substantially increased pressure on the remaining forest resources. Accelerated erosion is one expected consequence of this.
The Indian government has committed itself to plant new forest to compensate for what is lost. Either an unforested area of equal size is to be converted into forest, or an area of degraded forest, twize the size of the lost forest area, will be upgraded by planting young trees. The Morse commission points to several problems related to these seemingly positive policies. On one hand, new forest lands will be situated in areas of fairly low soil quality, because buying fertile land for afforestation would be too expensive. Thus, the replacement forest will be of inferior quality to the submerged forest. On the other hand, in the cases of upgrading degraded existing forests the total forested area will be reduced by the submergence.
Catchment area treatment is necessary to reduce erosion. The higher erosion rates in the catchment area, the quicker the dam is filled with silt, shortening the life span of the project. Common methods of reducing erosion are afforestation and terracing. The measures planned as part of the Sardar Sarovar project considers only the part of the catchment draining directly into the reservoir itself.
Local populations have not been included or consulted neither in the re-afforestation or catchment area treatment plans. This will surely undermine the positive effects of these measures. Without the cooperation and participation of the local people using the area, such programs will amount to little but symbolic and short-term effects. Firstly, without incorporating the local people, the programs will not address the basic sources of deforestation, namely the land use system that is found in any particular area. Secondly, if the local people are not included in planning and execution of the programs, they will not feel responsible towards them, and will have few incentives to follow up the projects. The constant absence of reliable socio-economic data increases difficulties in planning and executing these programs.
With the present progress on these measures, they will not be finalised until the reservoir is filled, at the earliest. This is a violation of the guidelines set by Indian environmental authorities. The present time frames for the programs are actually way too optimistic if the programs are to be executed in a satisfactory manner, including consultation and cooperation with the local populations (Morse, 1992 a).
Agriculture
Some of the most fertile agricultural lands in this part of India will be submerged by the reservoir. In addition to the area of permanent submergence, an area of unknown size will be prone to annual flooding as a result of the project. The size of this area will depend on the intensity of monsoon rains, and the amount of sediments disposed in the reservoir. There are no thorough studies to give reasonable predictions about the amount of land which will be affected in this manner. However, according to the Morse commission, this problem is strongly underestimated by the project authorities (Morse, 1992 a).
Replacing the drowned agricultural lands will probably not be possible. To secure new land for the displaced people, the project authorities have three options, all three of which have been used to relocate Sardar Sarovar oustees: They may allocate land which is presently not used for agricultural purposes, which is not a good solution, as there is little un-tilled land which is suitable for agriculture. In a densely populated country such as India, there is a reason why land lies fallow - it is not fertile enough to make farming worthwhile. Where this strategy has been used, the resettlers have experienced severe hardships and a decline in living standards. The second option, that the project authorities buy agricultural land from private land-owners, also has its problems. Where this is done, the peasants and workers who used to earn their living from this land are rendered unemployed, and might be seen as "secondary displaced". This simply shifts the problem on to others. The third option would be to clear forest lands in order to provide new agricultural fields for the displaced. Major problems related to this option is deforestation and conflicts with local populations living in the forest areas or depending on forest resources. In Maharashtra, the tribal people of a forest area have protested energetically against plans to resettle Sardar Sarovar oustees in "their" forest, thus forcing them to move. One woman from this area was shot dead by the police when they entered her village to forcibly evict the residents, to clear the area for resettlers from the Sardar Sarovar dam area.
Salinisation and waterlogging
Of the total area to be irrigated by Sardar Sarovar, only some 40 percent is classified as "suitable" and "very suitable" for irrigation. As to the remaining 60 percent, there are more or less severe problems related to high salt content in the soil or in the groundwater, or a propensity for waterlogging. Waterlogging occurs when groundwater levels reach so high that plant roots are more or less drowned, thus reducing fertility.
Plans for mitigating waterlogging and salinity problems are non-existent for about three fourths of the vulnerable area, and the plans for the remaining 25 percent are largely inadequate. The existing mitigating plans make a point of combining the use of pumped ground water and surface water from the canals. The Morse commission maintains that this may lead to quality degradation of the groundwater, and that the measure is of a very short-sighted nature (Morse, 1992 a). Proper drainage is the only measure that may succeed in mitigating these problems in a long term perspective. However, plans for drainage are totally absent for about 75 percent of the command area. In addition, much of the land is very flat, making it difficult and expensive to drain. Finally, draining so large areas is in itself a major operation, and requires major alterations in the physical environment. These questions have not been studied in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Projects.
Water flow, erosion and water quality
The construction of Sardar Sarovar and perhaps other dams on the Narmada will imply changes in downstream water quality. During the early project phases, downstream water flow is not expected to be significantly reduced. In later phases, as more water is diverted to the canals and possibly to irrigation schemes related to other dams upstream, the amount of water flowing in the original riverbed downstream of Sardar Sarovar will be substantially reduced.
As most of the sediments carried by the river will be deposited in the Sardar Sarovar reservoir, there will be changes in the patterns of erosion and deposition. Erosion of the existing river channel will probably increase, and will be more severe in areas nearest to the dam structures.
In later project phases, it is expected that the quality of water downstream will be substantially degraded, for several reasons. Reduction of water flow means that saline seawater will penetrate further up the river. This will entail severe impacts on life in the river, as a substantial stretch of the river will change from fresh to brackish. Saline water might also seep into groundwater reservoirs which serve as sources of drinking water. Industrial waste and agricultural chemicals caused by new industrial activities and changes in agricultural practises, coupled with less water to dilute these substances, may serve to increase the concentration of pollutants in the river waters. No thorough assessment of downstream environmental impacts of the Sardar Sarovar Projects has ever been made.
Fisheries
The increased salinity, decreased water quality and reduced amount of nutrients and sediments in the Narmada are bound to have impacts on fish and other life in the river. Economically, freshwater prawns and hilsa (a species of salmon) are of particular importance. Narmada is one of only a few rivers which the hilsa use for spawning. Both prawns and hilsa are sensitive to changes in their physical environment, and hilsa is known to have left rivers following construction of dams. Thus, there is danger of both hilsa and the freshwater prawns disappearing from the Narmada, or at least diminishing in numbers.
Seismicity
There is a recognised danger of an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale occuring in the Sardar Sarovar vicinity. It is expected that at least one major earthquake will occur during the dam's life-span. An earthquake would also have impacts apart from the immediate effects, even if the dam itself is not damaged. For example, an earthquake would probably cause landslides into the reservoir and upstream river, thus increasing sedimentation in the reservoir and reducing the life-span of the dam (Paranjpye, 1989).
5. 6 THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
In 1985, the World Bank approved a 450 million US dollar loan to the Sardar Sarovar Projects. The Bank has been heavily criticised for approving the loan before Indian environmental authorities had cleared the project. The World Bank also chose to view Sardar Sarovar as a separate project, even though Indian environmental authorities insisted that the Sardar Sarovar and Narmada Sagar dams be regarded as interrelated projects whose cumulative impacts needed to be evaluated before going ahead with either of them. In the following years, the World Bank received continuous criticism because of the repeated and gross violations of the Bank’s own resettlement and environmental guidelines. The criticism came both from the local people's representatives, from non-governmental organisations and from within the Bank itself. Several times the Bank discussed these questions with the borrower, but no substantial changes in project approach came out of this. The World Bank simply ignored the violations, kept supporting the project, and did nothing to enforce changes in the project approach.
The Morse commission
By 1991, criticism had become so loud that the World Bank decided to let a group of experts review the social and environmental aspects of the project. The commission’s leader was the former head of UNDP, Bradford Morse. The Report of the Independent Review, the so-called Morse report, was released in the spring of 1992 and is basically a devastating critique of the project. The main thread of the report is the totally inadequate planning of the project, and the absence of vital baseline data in all parts of the project.
Both the World Bank and the Indian authorities were strongly criticised by the Morse commission. The report shows in detail how the World Bank has violated virtually every single environmental and resettlement guideline, both its own and international ones, in connection with this project. According to the commission "the Sardar Sarovar Projects as they stand are flawed", and progression in a positive direction cannot be expected as long as construction continues (Morse, 1992 a). The main recommendation from the commission to the Bank is to "step back" from the project and demand that construction work be halted while the project is reviewed in its entirety.
The Morse report created a stir internally in the World Bank. Bank staff was clearly very eager to continue supporting the Projects, and on several occasions Bank staff produced documents with untrue claims and false information, in order to "persuade" the Board of Directors to vote in favour of continued support. Bradford Morse reacted strongly to this way of responding to his commission's report, and together with Donald Gamble, the commission’s senior advisor on environment, he wrote a letter to the President of the World Bank. The letter strongly criticises the way the Bank responded to the commission's report:
"We believe this (...) document, along with its Annexes, is misleading. It ignores or misrepresents the main findings of our Review. (...) The Bank may reject our finding that its incremental strategy has failed. The Bank may reject our finding that the pari passu approach [making the environmental impact assessments simultaneously with construction works on the dam] is unsound. The Bank may decide that overriding political and economic considerations are so compelling that its Operational Directives are irrelevant when decisions have to be made about the Sardar Sarovar Projects. But it should not seek to reshape our report to support such decisions" (Morse, 1992 b).
The Bank withdraws
In October 1992, the Board of Directors gave its support to the project for another half a year, making support beyond this conditional on the achievement of certain benchmarks by the project authorities. The day before these benchmarks should have been met, India cancelled the remainder of the loan, in a move to save face for both the Bank and India. At this point, 280 out of the 450 million US dollar loan had already been disbursed. For the time being, all other World Bank loans to the Narmada Valley Development Plan are shelved.
The 1995 World Bank Project Completion Report on the Sardar Sarovar project admits that the Bank has violated its own guidelines and operational directives, and states this as one of the major reasons for the problems facing the project. The report also agrees that the water yield of the river has been overestimated.
5. 7 COSTS AND BENEFITS
At this point, there is no way of determining the exact costs and benefits of the project. What seems certain is that project costs are underestimated, while benefits are overestimated. This is a familiar pattern from large dam projects around the world, as well as other large developments.
Of basic importance to the project benefits is the water flow of the Narmada river; the water is the benefit, so to speak. Due to the use of imprecise analytical methods, several experts have found that there is probably substantially less water flowing in the river than what is estimated in the project plans. According to Vijay Paranjpye, the river probably carries 16 percent less water than the official estimate (Paranjpye, 1990). In 1994 the government of Madhya Pradesh admitted that the water yield of the river had been overestimated.
According to the project authorities, some 60 percent of the water diverted to the irrigation canals will be utilised (the rest disappears through evaporation, seepage etc.). However, in similar projects in India the rate of usable water in such canals is on average only 25-30 percent. The estimate for usable water in the Sardar Sarovar canals therefore seems unrealistically optimistic. In addition, this figure is based on the assumption that Narmada Sagar is built. Without this dam, the amount of water diverted to the canals will be reduced by yet another 30 percent.
Knowing this, it seems very unlikely that the project could provide irrigation water for an area as large as planned. There will also be less water available for other purposes which the project is supposed to serve. In spite of this, the estimated number of people to receive drinking water from the project was raised from 32 million to 40 million in 1992, but no more water was allocated to serve this end. No plans are made for the distribution of drinking water.
As stated above, the number of people to be displaced by the project has increased tenfold since the cost- benefit analyses of the project were first made. The price-tag of the resettlement and rehabilitation programs is at present unknown.
According to World Bank analyses, the project is not going to be economically viable if project costs increase by more than 15 percent, if the construction period is prolonged by more than five years, or if project incomes are reduced by more than 13 percent (Paranjpye, 1990). Given the above facts, it seems very unlikely that the project will ever be economically viable.
The areas most in need of water are mainly situated at the very end of the canals. In years of less than average monsoon rains (which occur on average every four years), there will not be enough water to serve the drought-prone areas at the far ends of the canals. Given the uncertain estimates of the flow of the Narmada, there is a distinct possibility that there will never be enough water to supply these areas. The 1995 Project Completion Report made by the World Bank states that the water yield of the river has been overestimated, that the water requirement has been underestimated and that the assumed irrigation efficiency is unrealistically high. According to the report, this means that the last 30 percent of the command area needs to be removed from the project benefited zone, as it is unviable to take water to these areas. This destroys the very rationale of the project. Lastly, there is the distinct probability that the canals will never be finished, due to financial problems.
5. 8 RESISTANCE TO THE PROJECT
Ever since the project plans started to materialise, various non-governmental organisations have taken interest in the scheme, in order to safeguard the interests of the affected people. Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save The Narmada Movement) was started in 1985, demanding better resettlement programs for the affected people. However, in 1988 NBA concluded that satisfactory resettlement of all affected people was not possible. Therefore, they chose to oppose the project altogether. Over the years, an ever increasing proportion of the affected people have joined the organisation. Their attitude is that the authorities have no right to displace communities from their traditional lands, making them suffer severely, in order to build a large infrastructure project which will not benefit the poor and needy. Civil disobedience and non-cooperation in the Gandhian tradition have been important strategies for the protesters. Their strongest "weapon" in the struggle is their refusal to move from their homes, even if this means they will drown in the rising waters behind the dam. In 1993, more than 22 000 affected families pledged that they would not move from their villages, whatever happened.
The strong resistance to the project is a major obstacle to the project authorities' push for progress. Field work in the valley has been made difficult or almost impossible, as residents do not allow field workers and other project-related people to enter the villages. As mentioned, the Morse commission is of the opinion that in this situation, project progress cannot take place unless by "unacceptable means".
